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THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: 
DISCHARGEABILITY OF OBLIGATIONS INCURRED 
UNDER PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS, 
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS, AND 
DIVORCE DECREES 
«It is the underlying policy of the Bankruptcy Act to give the 
bankrupt a fresh start and to relieve him 0/ pre-existing debts. 
In many instances the determination of what is alimony, {main-
tenance, and support} comes into direct cOl!flict with this pol-
icy. "1 Under the Act these debts are nondischargeable. Thus, 
in an attempt to construe the Act narrowly and uphold the un-
derlying p07icy of fresh start, courts are faced with the problem 
of determining how to characterize marital obligations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 1, 1979 the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
(the Code) became effective. Section 523(a)(5) of the Code provides 
that any debt owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor 
for alimony, maintenance, or support be nondischargeable.2 This sec-
tion continues the historical approach of protecting spouses or children 
from future adversities which they may face when the family unit is 
destroyed. Hence, section 523(a)(5) codifies the belief that upon divorce 
the former spouse, rather than society, should be responsible for the 
maintenance and support of the economically dependent spouse and 
child. Family support obligations have traditionally been considered a 
duty, not a debt, and therefore are deemed more important than the 
debtor's fresh start. 
Under the Code, however, an equitable division of property is a 
dischargeable debt. Consequently, most of the litigation that arises 
under section 523(a)(5) requires the court to interpret property settle-
ments and separation agreements to determine whether they represent 
alimony, support, maintenance, or an equitable division of property. 
This comment discusses and compares the law as it existed under 
the prior Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act) with the law as it presently 
exists under the Code. The primary focus is on the problems courts face 
in interpreting property settlements, separation agreements, and di-
vorce decrees to determine the dischargeability of a debtor's debts. The 
problem arises because in making this determination courts must bal-
ance the policy of giving the debtor a fresh start against that of requir-
ing the debtor to satisfy his marital obligations. Alimony is clearly 
nondischargeable; however, third party debts are dischargeable and 
consequently courts are faced with the problem of determining the na-
ture of the debts in order to determine discharge ability. 
1. In re Bomer, Bankruptcy No. W-122-73 (S.D. Iowa, Oct. 30, 1973). 
2. See II U.S.c. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Definitions 
The pivotal issue relevant to the discharge of marital debts in 
bankruptcy is whether an award in a divorce decree constitutes a grant 
of alimony or a division of property. Although the designation of 
property settlement or alimony in a divorce agreement is not conclusive 
it may be regarded as persuasive.3 Hence, a brief discussion of the 
methods used by courts to determine the nature of awards in divorce 
settlements is warranted. 
1. Alimony, Support, and Maintenance 
At common law, courts found the justification for alimony, sup-
port, and maintenance in the general duty imposed upon the husband 
to support his wife and child.4 Consequently, courts considered 
spousal obligations to be nondischargeable duties as opposed to dis-
chargeable debts.s The United States Supreme Court explained this 
rationale when it noted that "the Bankruptcy law should ... [not) de-
prive dependent wife and children of the support and maintenance due 
them from the husband and father, which it has ever been the purpose 
of the law to enforce."6 
The problem arises, however, in that neither the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 nor the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 include a definition of 
the term alimony.7 Consequently, a frequently litigated issue under the 
original Act and the Code involves the determination of exactly what 
constitutes alimony, support, and maintenance. In the early cases, 
courts viewed alimony as an allowance by which a husband paid for 
his wife's maintenance, as well as for the support of his minor child-
ren.s These courts automatically presumed the existence of a duty of 
spousal support that generally terminated upon the dependent spouse's 
remarriage or the supporting spouse's death.9 Courts today adopt this 
3. Martin v. Henley, 452 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 
1940). One reason the designation is only persuasive is because many state courts 
assimilate the property division into the alimony decree, taking into account the 
same factors which are relevant in setting alimony when they are, in fact, dividing 
property. Thus, the courts have come to blur the distinction between alimony 
orders and divisions of property. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8 (West 1968). 
4. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 
(1901); Turner v. Turner, 108 F. 785 (D. Ind. 1901); In re Shepard, 97 F. 187 
(D.N.Y. 1899). 
5. See cases cited supra note 4. 
6. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). 
7. See 11 U.S.c. § 35 (1976) (Bankruptcy Act of 1898); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. 
V 1981) (Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). 
8. Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1956); see also Wetmore v. 
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928); Westmore-
land v. Dodd, 2 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 267 U.S. 595 (1924). 
9. See cases cited supra note 8. 
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same definition of alimony. 10 However, instead of automatically 
presuming a duty of support between the spouses, modem courts im-
pose alimony only upon a finding based on relative need, the length of 
the marriage, and the presence of minor children. II 
2. Property 
Debts are considered dischargeable in bankruptcy if the court de-
termines that they arise out of a division of marital property. 12 Whereas 
the primary purpose of alimony is to support the wife and children, the 
function of a property settlement is to divide what is considered prop-
erty owned by each spouse. 13 Such a settlement is usually based on the 
equities that exist between the parties at the time of the divorce, 14 
rather than on the wife's needs and the husband's income. IS Since the 
rights of the parties in a property settlement are determined according 
to the law of contracts, I the agreement will remain in effect despite 
remarriage or changed financial conditions. 17 Hence, courts generally 
view an obligation which does not terminate upon death or remarriage 
of the spouse and does not aPEear to relate to living expenses as indica-
tive of a property settlement. 8 
B. Cases Decided Prior to the Enactment of the 1978 Code 
As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not specifi-
cally except alimony or support obligations from the discharge of 
debts.19 Rather, a debt had to be provable in order for it to be dis-
charged.20 Under section 63 of the original Act, a provable debt was a 
fixed liability evidenced by a judgment or instrument in writing.21 The 
debt had to be absolutely owing at the time of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, whether then payable or not, and founded upon an express or 
lO. See, e.g., In re George, 15 Bankr. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 
434 (D. Utah 1980). 
11. See cases cited supra note 10. 
12. Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977); Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th 
Cir. 1956); In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928); In re Loeber, 12 Bankr. 669 
(D.N.J. 1981); see also 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 801 (1981); Annot., 74 
A.L.R.2d 758 (1960). 
13. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8 
(West 1968). See In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775, 778 (D.N.M. 1981). 
14. See In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958); In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 
(D.N.M. 1981). 
15. Courts take these factors into account when determining the amount of alimony. 
See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
16. See In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958). 
17.Id-
18. In re Taff, lO Bankr. 101 (D. Conn. 1981). 
19. See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. § 35 (1976». 
20. See id § 63 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1976». 
21. Id 
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implied contract.22 Generally, courts followed the rule that alimony 
and support payments were not provable claims, and thus a discharge 
in bankruptcy did not affect the bankrupt's obligation to pay accrued or 
future subsidies.23 
The courts relied primarily on two factors to determine that ali-
mony, maintenance, and support obligations were nondischargeable. 
First, courts looked to the strong public policy that underlied the com-
mon law duty of the husband to support the wife and child.24 Second, 
because such responsibilities were not considered debts, they were not 
deemed to be provable.25 For example, in Audubon v. Shufeldt,26 the 
issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the debtor 
spouse was entitled to a discharge from the arrears of alimony due his 
former wife.27 The Court concluded that "neither the alimony in ar-
rears at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, nor alimony accru-
ing since that adjudication were provable in bankruptcy, or barred by 
the discharge."28 The Court further noted that: "Alimony does not 
arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage. 
It is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and 
legal duty of the husband to support the wife."29 . 
Similarly, in Wetmore v. Markoe,30 the Supreme Court held that 
the bankrupt husband's obligation to pay alimony is based on his com-
mon law duty of support.31 Consequently, the Court ruled that the lia-
bility of alimony is saved from discharge in bankruptcy.32 In reaching 
its decision, the Court relied upon the reasoning of Audubon, 33 and 
found that an alimony decree is not a debt, but rather a "legal means of 
enforcing the obligation of the husband and father to support and 
maintain his wife and children."34 Furthermore, the Court held that 
this duty arises not from any contractual obligation, but from an obli-
gation that the law automatically imposes upon the husband when he 
neglects or refuses to voluntarily discharge this responsibility.35 
22.1d. 
23. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 
(1901); Turner v. Turner, 108 F. 785 (D. Ind. 1901); In re Shepard, 97 F. 187 
(D.N.Y. 1899); In re Anderson, 97 F. 321 (D. N.Y. 1899). Con/ra In re Houston, 
94 F. 119 (D. Ky. 1899); In re Van Orden, 96 F. 86 (D.N.J. 1899); In re Chalioner, 
98 F. 82 (D. Ill. 1899); Arrington v. Arrington, 131 N.C. 143,42 S.E. 554 (1902). 
24. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 
(1903); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901). 
25. See cases cited supra note 24. 
26. 181 U.S. 575 (1901). 
27. Id. at 576-77. 
28. Id. at 580. 
29. Id. at 577. 
30. 196 U.S. 68 (1904). 
31. Id. at 74. 
32. Id. at 77. 
33.1d. at 72-76. 
34.1d. 
35. Id. at 73-74. 
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In 1903, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to include a provi-
sion that specifically excepted alimony, maintenance, and support pay-
ments from discharge in bankruptcy.36 Although merely declaratory of 
the true meaning and sense of the original Act,37 the amendment was 
passed with a view toward settling the law and putting to rest any con-
troversies that arose from conflicting decisions in both state and federal 
courtS.38 Although the 1903 amendment made it clear that alimony, 
maintenance, and support obligations were excepted from discharge in 
bankruptcy, the courts were still faced with interpreting divorce decrees 
and property settlement agreements to determine whether such obliga-
tions actually constituted alimony, support, or maintenance.39 While 
some federal courts simply accepted the state court's terminology as 
indicative of alimony and property agreements,40 other courts main-
tained that the bankruptcy court is required to look to the substance of 
the payment obligation in question and not to the labels imposed by 
state law.41 
Schacter v. Schacter42 and In re Waller 43 illustrate the different 
approaches taken by courts under the 1898 Act to determine the nature 
of the obligation in question. In Schacter, the husband contended that 
since the payments required by the separation agreement44 did not 
meet the technical requirements of alimony under Maryland law, the 
debt constituted a property settlement and was therefore dischargea-
ble.45 The court rejected the husband's argument and stated: "Pay-
36. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 17,32 Stat. 797 (codified as amended at II U.S.c. 
§ 35(a)(7) (1976». The section states that Uta] discharge in bankruptcy shall re-
lease a bankrupt from all of his provable debts. . . except such as. . . (7) are for 
alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife and child 
.... " Id 
37. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). 
38. Id at 76-77; see also Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901). 
39. The problem arises because many state courts neglect to observe the alimony-
property distinction in making financial provisions for the wife in the course of 
divorce. Further, the parties themselves do the same thing in drafting separation 
agreements in which alimony and property settlements are inextricably mingled 
- the amount agreed upon as alimony being arrived at in consideration for the 
amount to be transferred as property and vice versa. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8 (West 1968). 
40. See, e.g., Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977); Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 
304 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974); In re Alcorn, 162 F. 
Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958). Cf. Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (by the 
express terms of the Constitution, bankruptcy law is federal law). 
41. Schacter v. Schacter, 467 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md.), offd mem., 610 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 
1979); In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 
(D. Utah 1980). 
42. 467 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md.), offd mem., 610 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1979). 
43. 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974). 
44. The separation agreement provided in pertinent part that: "Husband shall pay to 
Wife for her support and maintenance, until she dies or remarries, the sum of Two 
Hundred Seventy-Five ($275.00) Dollars per month, beginning with the month of 
August, 1961." 467 F. Supp. at 65. 
45. Id at 66; see In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975) (amount awarded to 
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ments required by a contract for the support and maintenance of a wife 
are not dischargeable in bankruptcy even though they do not constitute 
payments for alimony under state law. . . and even though the separa-
tion agreement itself contains }!;rovisions concerning the settlement of 
property rights of the parties." Thus, the Schacler court determined 
that merely because the payments do not meet the technical require-
ments of alimony under state law does not automatically mean that the 
payments are not intended for the wife's support.47 
Conversely, in In re Waller, 48 the agreement at issue was incorpor-
ated into a divorce decree and provided that the husband pay, indem-
nify, and hold the wife harmless from all existing obligations.49 The 
Sixth Circuit held that the obligation constituted support and, there-
fore, had not been discharged in the husband's bankruptcy proceed-
debtor's spouse by divorce court, while not alimony under Texas law, constituted 
support payments which fell within the exception to discharge). 
46. 467 F. Supp. at 66; see In re Ridder, 79 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 
U.S. 721 (1936); In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928). 
47.467 F. Supp. at 66; see also Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode, 19 Md. App. 597, 313 A.2d 
569, cert. denied, 271 Md. 735 (1974) (a separation agreement which does not meet 
aU the requirements for technical alimony is a "contractual agreement for sup-
port"). 
Although decided in 1981, the Fourth Circuit applied the law as it was prior 
to the enactment of the 1978 Code in the case of Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300 
(4th Cir. 1981) (applying Illinois law). In Melichar, the separation agreement, 
which was executed in Illinois, provided that the husband pay the wife a lump 
sum settlement in lieu of alimony, payable in monthly installments for 121 
months. Id at 301. The agreement also provided that if the wife remarried, the 
husband remained liable for the monthly installments for nine years. Id at 301-
02. Subsequently, the husband filed for bankruptcy in the District of Maryland 
and sought to be discharged from further obligation under the agreement. Id at 
302. The issue presented to the court was whether the husband's obligation to 
make these payments to his former wife constituted a debt for alimony within the 
meaning of section 17(a)(7) of the prior Act so as to except it from discharge upon 
bankruptcy. Id The bankruptcy court held the debt to be alimony, and therefore 
not dischargeable. 7 Bankr. at 966-68 (D. Md. 1980). The district court reversed 
the bankruptcy court and ruled that the debt was not alimony, and was discharge-
able. 661 F.2d at 302-03. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed and reinstated the judgment of the bankruptcy court. 661 F.2d at 303. 
The court of appeals determined that the district court's most significant error was 
its view that the intention of the parties to create alimony could only be proved by 
showing that the payments qualified as alimony under state law. Id at 303. The 
Fourth Circuit noted that classification of an agreement under state law is an im-
portant factor in determining intent, but went on to hold that: 
[T]he agreement may be a hybrid of two means of paying alimony rec-
ognized by state law, and the fact that it combines features of both does 
not automatically destroy the nature of the payment as alimony. The 
proper test of whether the payments are alimony lies in proof of whether 
it was the intention of the parties that the payments be for support rather 
than as a property settlement. 
Id at 303. See also Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); 3 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15, at 523-11 (15th ed. 1983). 
48. 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974). 
49. Id at 448. 
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ings.50 The court stated that "[t]he law of Ohio must be resorted to in 
order to determine what constitutes alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port."51 Hence, the court determined that in light of the state statute, 
history, and case law the husband's obligation constituted support and 
was therefore nondischargeable.52 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 
1978 
In cases decided under the original Act, courts were confronted 
with two conflicting policy considerations: requiring the bankrupt 
spouse to fulfill obligations arising out of the broken marriage and giv-
ing the debtor a fresh start unencumbered by the burdens of pre-ex-
isting debts. 53 Courts applied varying state standards and definitions in 
an effort to resolve this conflict, and consequently, federal case law evi-
denced varied and inconsistent results with regard to the dis-
chargeability of maintenance and support obligations. 54 Congress 
addressed this problem through the enactment of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978.55 
The Code effectuates several changes in the former law as it re-
lated to the nondischargeability of alimony, support, and mainte-
nance.56 For example, it is well established that no federal domestic 
50. Id. at 451. 
51. Id. at 448. 
52. Id. at 448-51. 
53. See In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D. Minn. 1980); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. 
Utah 1980); Lee, Dischargeability of Debt: Alimony, Maintenance or Support, 5 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 175 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lee]. 
54. See In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D. Minn. 1980). 
55. See II U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(Supp. V 1981). This section provides that: 
(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt-
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, 
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a 
separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement, 
but not to the extent that -
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of 
law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 
402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act); or 
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or 
support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, main-
tenance, or support; 
Id. The major purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was the modernization of 
bankruptcy law. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5787. 
56. The Code abolished the concept of provability of debt contained in the original 
Act. Under the Code, a "claim" is defined as any right to payment, whether or 
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured. 
II U.S.C. § 101(4)(a) (Supp. V 1981). Further, a "claim" includes an equitable 
right to performance that does not give rise to a right of payment. Id. § 101 (4)(b); 
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relations law exists separate from state divorce law.57 Accordingly, ju-
risdiction over such matters as marriage, divorce, child custody, ali-
mony and child support remain in the state courts. 58 However, the 
legislative history of the Code makes it clear that the intent of Congress 
is to allow federal courts to determine whether characterizations of ali-
mony or support made by state courts could meet the meaning of such 
terms as they arise in the bankruptcy context.59 Hence, under section 
523(a)(5) of the Code, federal bankruptcy law, not state law, is applied 
to determine what constitutes alimony, support, or maintenance.60 The 
primary effect of this provision is to overrule those cases decided under 
the original Act, which assumed that state law controlled the determi-
nation of the nature of these obligations.61 Some courts today continue 
to examine state law despite the fact that the Code overruled those 
cases, decided under the prior Act, relying upon state law to make their 
determinations.62 For example, in In re Spong, 63 the court recognized 
that determinations of alimony, maintenance, and support are made 
under federal bankruptcy law rather than state law.64 Yet the court 
also found that reference to the well established state law is not pre-
cluded by the Code.65 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Lombard noted 
see H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5887. The definition of claim permits the 
broadest possible relief in a bankruptcy case and permits a complete settlement of 
the affairs of a bankrupt debtor, a complete discharge, and a fresh start. Id; see 
also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.02 (15thed. 1983). 
57. De La Roma V. De La Roma, 201 U.S. 303 (1906); accord In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 
775 (D.N.M. 1981);In re Bishop, 13 Bankr. 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);In re Hughes, 16 
Bankr. 90 (N.D. Ala. 1980). However, some courts have said that section 523 
(a)(5) is an attempt by Congress to establish a new federal standard by which to 
determine the dischargeability of a debt. See In re Daviau, 10 Bankr. 201 (D. 
Mass. 1981); Williams V. Gurley, 3 Bankr. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
58. See In re Dirks, 15 Bankr 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Bishop, 13 Bankr. 304 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Hughes, 16 Bankr. 90 (N.D. Ala. 1980). "Federal bank-
ruptcy law is not the source of these obligations, it takes them as it finds them and, 
when necessary, characterizes the legal relations existing between the parties for 
its own purposes." In re Albin, 541 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1979). 
59. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6320; S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865; see also In re Dirks, 
15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981). 
60. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6320; S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865. 
61. See In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67 (M.D. Fla. 1981). 
62. See In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (nothing in the legislative history sug-
gests that state law plays no part in making the determination); In re Lineberry, 9 
Bankr. 700 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (same); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(same). 
63. 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981). 
64. Id at 9. The court noted that the husband has an "unescapable duty," both at 
common law and by statute, to support his wife by providing her with the neces-
saries of life according to her station. Id 
65. Id 
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that bankruptcy law is uniform and state law is diverse, and that "when 
Congress directs [the courts] to determine a matter under bankruptcy 
law, recourse to state law seems inappropriate."66 Although other 
courts proffer the same reasoning as Judge Lombard,67 it appears that 
most courts refer to state law to aid in the determination of the nature 
of a divorce decree.68 
One of the more significant clarifications under the Code is the 
provision that excepts from discharge those debts that provide "mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a sepa-
ration agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement 
agreement . ... "69 A plain reading of section 523(a)(5) indicates that 
contracted liabilities for goods, medical attention, or board, supplied by 
a spouse for the use and benefit of the ex-spouse or child, may not fall 
within the exception to discharge if it is not specifically provided for 
within the agreement or decree.7o Courts that construed section 
17(a)(7) of the original Act had expressed doubt as to whether a prop-
erty settlement could ever be characterized as alimony.71 Under the 
Code, section 523(a)(5) directs courts to initially determine whether the 
purpose of the agreement is to provide maintenance for, or support of, 
both spouse and child.72 If the proper purpose is found, such obliga-
66. Id at 11-12 (Lombard, J., dissenting). 
67. See, e.g., In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67 
(M.D. Fla. 1981). 
68. See, e.g., In re Moyer, 13 Bankr. 436 (W.O. Mo. 1981); In re Rank, 12 Bankr. 418 
(D. Kan. 1981); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Allen, 4 Bankr. 
617 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). 
69. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added); see 124 CONGo REC. 
HII096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONGo REc. 
S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); see also In re Leach, 
15 Bankr. 1005 (D. Conn. 1981); In re Graham, 14 Bankr. 246 (W.O. Ky. 1981). 
See generally, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15[2], at 523-109 (15th ed. 
1983). 
70. See, e.g., In re Ostrander, 139 F. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1905); see also 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15[2], at 523-111 (15th ed. 1983). 
71. See, e.g., Goggans V. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1956); In re Adams, 25 F.2d 
640 (2d Cir. 1928); In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958). 
72. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15[3], at 523-111 to-l13 (15th ed. 1983). 
The Code also makes some minor changes in the law. The Code explicitly pro-
vides that the designation of a debt as alimony, maintenance, or support will not 
bring it within the terms of the section unless the liability is actually in the nature 
of alimony, support, or maintenance. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1981). 
This is considered a minor change because under the original Act most courts 
implicitly looked to the substance of an agreement rather than the label that was 
placed on a particular obligation. See In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 
1977); In re Thompson, 13 Bankr. 830 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Newman, 15 
Bankr. 67 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980). In addi-
tion section 523(a)(5) is more precise than the former section 35(a)(7) in that it 
substitutes the word "spouse" for "wife" and thus excepts from discharge ali-
mony, support, or maintenance due to a husband from a debtor-wife. This was 
not a significant change either, since under the original Act most courts extended 
the coverage of the section to husbands. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(Supp. V 1981). See 
Stephens V. Stephens, 465 F. Supp. 145 (W.O. Va. 1979); In re Crist, 460 F. Supp. 
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tions are deemed nondischargeable, even if they are in terms of a prop-
erty settlement. 
A. Tests to Determine Whether an Obligation is Dischargeable 
It was originally thought that upon the Code's enactment, many of 
the inconsistencies that existed in bankruptcy decisions would be re-
solved. However, one of the most difficult problems federal courts en-
counter remains in distinguishing a contract for the division of property 
from a contract for maintenance and support.73 Since there is no fed-
eral definition of alimony, maintenance, or support courts must look to 
state law where definitions of these words continue to be couched in 
broad terms, instead of in such a way as to be "sufficiently narrow in 
scope so as to minimize infringement of this exception to discharge on 
the objective of assuring the bankrupt a fresh start."74 As a result, 
courts retain the same rationale they applied prior to the Code's enact-
ment and the bankrupt spouse does not always receive a fresh start free 
from existing obligations. 
Courts employ different tests in an attempt to determine the nature 
and dischargeability of an obligation. The intent test is most com-
monly applied by the courtS.75 If the parties expressly intend for the 
debt assumption to constitute alimony, maintenance, or support, the 
court will uphold that express intent.76 When an agreement or decree 
is unambiguous, its purpose is determined by an analysis of the "four 
comers" of the instrument.77 However, when the contract is ambigu-
ous, the court will examine all the surrounding facts and circumstances 
of the case to determine the aim of the parties when the instrument was 
drawn.78 Since the effect of filing for bankruptcy is usually not contem-
plated by the parties when an agreement is drafted, a court will not 
891 (N.D. Ga. 1978). But see In re Wasserman, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 467 
(D.R.!. 1977) (section 35(a)(7) was unconstitutional because it provided nondis-
chargeability only for debts owing to the wife). See generally 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15 (15th ed. 1983). 
73. See In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958); 1 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.36 (1981); Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obliga-
tions in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REV. 231, 232 (1976). 
74. Lee, supra note 53, at 178. The thrust of the Code is directed at rehabilitating the 
debtor and allowing him a fresh start. In re Brace, 13 Bankr. 551 (N.D. Ohio 
1981). See also In re Hughes, 16 Bankr. 90, 92 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (the main problem 
in interpreting section 523(a)(5) comes with defining the words alimony, support, 
and maintenance); In re Bishop, 13 Bankr. 304, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (the Code 
fails to establish a specific standard for determining when a claim qualifies as 
alimony, support, or maintenance). 
75. See, e.g., Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981) (decided under the 1898 
Act); Schacter v. Schacter, 476 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md.), aJl'd mem., 610 F.2d 813 (4th 
Cir. 1979). 
76. See cases cited supra note 74. 
77. In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re Norman, 13 Bankr. 894 
(W.D. Mo. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980). 
78. See cases cited supra note 77. 
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consider the agreement itself as evidence of their intent. 79 
The second test the courts apply to resolve the nature of an obliga-
tion is the necessaries test. 80 Necessaries include such items as housing, 
furniture, and food. 81 If these debts are included in the agreement, 
payment of them is held to constitute nondischargeable support. 82 
In addition to the tests and factors derived from case law, other 
courts interpret section 523(a)(5) as providing a two-fold test to deter-
mine the dischargeability of an obligation. First, pursuant to section 
523(a)(5)(A), in order to be held nondischargeable the payment must 
be made directly to a spouse or dependent and must not have been 
assigned to another entity voluntarily, by operation of law, or other-
wise.83 Second, the obligation must actually constitute alimony, main-
tenance, or s':j'port or the debt will be held dischargeable under section 
523(a)(5)(B). . 
, When the above tests are inadequate a court will explore several 
factors to further aid in its analysis of relevant obligations. Besides 
looking to the state's statutory definition of support,8S a court will scru-
tinize the parties' relative incomes to determine if the debt assumption 
was meant to balance a wide disparity in income.86 If such disparity is 
shown, the debt assumption is found to be in the nature of support. 87 
Similarly, if the obligation is revocable upon the dependent spouse's 
death or remarriage,88 or the spouse would be inadequately supported 
upon discharge of the debts,8 the obligation will be considered ali-
mony.90 Nevertheless, courts may hold that even if a debt was origi-
nally imposed on the basis of the need of the spouse or children the 
debt can be discharged unless, at the time of filing for bankruptcy, 
there exists a present need by the spouse or children that the debt be 
79. See In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434, 441 (D. Utah 1980). 
80. See In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Miller, 8 Bankr. 174, 176-77 
(N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D. Fla. 1980); accord Poolman v. 
Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961); In re Baldwin, 250 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D. 
Neb. 1966). 
81. In re Uhock, 15 Bankr. 695 (W.D. Mo. 1981). 
82. See cases cited supra note 80. 
83. See In re LaFleur, 11 Bankr. 26 (D. Mass. 1981); In re Drumheller, 13 Bankr. 707 
(W.D. Ky. 1981). 
84. See cases cited supra note 83. 
85. See In re Jensen, 17 Bankr. 537 (W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 
(D.N.M. 1981); In re Lineberry, 9 Bankr. 700 (W.D. Mo. 1981). See, e.g., MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05 (1981) (factors used by the court in 
determining property division/monetary awards in divorce cases). 
86. See In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D. 
Minn. 1980); In re Diers, 7 Bankr. 18 (S.D. Ohio 1980). 
87. See cases cited supra note 86. 
88. See In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101 (D. Conn. 1981); In re Travis, [1978-1981 Transfer 
Binder) BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 67,520 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. June 2, 1980). 
89. See Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Breaux, 8 Bankr. 218 (W.D. 
La. 1981). 
90. See In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101 (D. Conn. 1981); In re Breaux, 8 Bankr. 218 (W.D. 
La. 1981). 
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paid.91 Other factors the court will look to are whether the payments 
are made in one lump sum or terminate upon some condition.92 Addi-
tional considerations are whether there are children involved;93 the 
length of the marriage;94 the relative earning powers of the parties;95 
the location of the provision in the agreement or decree;96 and the 
parties' neRotiations and understanding of the provisions of the 
agreement.9 
Although all these considerations are important in a court's analy-
sis, different jurisdictions assign varying weights to each factor. Fur-
thermore, because the facts of a case control its outcome, any "test" 
strictly enunciated by a court in one case might be liberally construed 
in the next.98 Generally, courts take account of all relevant factors and 
employ a balancing approach to weigh the requirement that the debtor 
fulfill his marital obligations against that of giving the debtor a fresh 
start.99 
B. Case Examples 
A general review of recent cases decided under the Code evidences 
that courts are not deciding cases much differently then they had under 
the 1898 Act. The Code is considered to be much narrower in scope 
than the original Act; 100 however, it has been construed broadly by 
many courts. Case law demonstrates that courts still appear to favor 
the findings of maintenance and support when the rights and responsi-
bilities of family relationships are involved. Consequently, the Code's 
policy of giving the debtor a fresh start is rendered less significant. The 
91. In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434, 442 (D. Utah 1980). The Warner court found that 
such a determination was necessary to enforce the general purpose of the bank-
ruptcy laws in providing relief for the debtor. Id.; accord In re Miller, 17 Bankr. 
717 (W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Bradley, 17 Bankr. 107 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); In re 
Nelson, 16 Bankr. 658 (M.D. Tenn 1981). But see In re Jensen, 17 Bankr. 537 
(W.D. Mo. 1982) (the plaintiffs current need is an irrelevant consideration; the 
determination must be based upon the intended function of the award "at the time 
of entry of the state court dissolution decree"). 
92. In re Snyder, 7 Bankr. 147 (W.D. Va. 1980). 
93. In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1981). 
94. In re Cartner, 9 Bankr. 543 (M.D. Ala. 1981). 
95. In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Fox, 5 Bankr. 317 (N.D. Tex. 
1980). 
96. In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1981). 
97. In re Lineberry, 9 Bankr. 700 (W.D. Mo. 1981). 
98. In re Thompson, 13 Bankr. 830 (W.D. Ky 1981). Compare In re Beckwith, 17 
Bankr. 816 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (mortgage obligations dischargeable) and In re 
Mineer, 11 Bankr. 663 (D. Cal. 1981) (same) with In re Ferrandino, 14 Bankr. 196 
(D. Nev. 1981) (mortgage obligations nondischargeable) and In re Mullins, 14 
Bankr. 771 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (same). 
99. See, e.g., In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67 
(M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980). 
100. See In re French, 9 Bankr. 464, 466 (S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348, 
350-51 (D. Minn. 1980). 
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following cases illustrate the various approaches courts have taken in 
determining the nature of a bankrupt's obligations. 
In In re Miller, 101 the terms of the separation agreement provided 
that the husband pay the second mortgage on the house, or in the alter-
native, pay the wife the monthly payments should she dispose of the 
property.102 The wife sold the property and paid off the second mort-
gage.103 The husband made no payments to the wife, and the wife 
claimed she was due $4,000 pursuant to the separation agreement. 
The court found the husband's debt to be in the nature of support 
and maintenance for the wife and child, and therefore nondischarge-
able. 104 The court based its decision on earlier cases which held that 
debts associated with support and maintenance are nondischargeable 
when the payments are made upon the mortgage for a home that pro-
vides shelter for the beneficiaries. lOS The court looked to the wife's un-
employment, the wife's custody of the minor child,l06 and the 
husband's monthly payments that enabled the wife to obtain and main-
tain suitable housing for herself and her child.107 In reaching the con-
clusion that the debt in question was nondischargeable, the court 
decided that the husband's marital obligations outweighed his right to 
a fresh start. 108 
In contrast, in In re Frey, 109 the bankruptcy court held that the 
husband's obligation under a property settlement was dischargeable 
when he was required to pay one-half of the mortgage payments on a 
mobile home occupied by the wife. 110 In making its determination, the 
court looked to Indiana statutory law for the circumstances giving rise 
to an order for alimony, support, or maintenance. III The court found 
the obligation to be in the nature of a property settlement, since the 
wife never specifically asked for, nor did the divorce court order pay-
ment of, alimony, support, or maintenance in the divorce proceed-
ing.112 Thus, the court concluded that the agreement in question 
appeared to be made in consideration of the fact that the home was 
purchased as a marital asset by both parties, and it allowed the parties 
to keep the mortgage payments current in an equitable manner until 
the house could be sold. 113 
101. 17 Bankr. 773 (N.D. Ohio 1982). 
102. Id. at 774. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 776. 
105. Id. at 775; see Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961); In re Mas-
simini, 8 Bankr. 428 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
106. 17. Bankr. at 776. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 13 Bankr. 12 (S.D. Ind. 1981). 
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In In re George, 114 the court held that joint debts assumed by the 
husband pursuant to a separation agreement were dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. The separation agreement in this case contained a clause 
that stated that the assumption of the joint debts constituted alimony, 
and as such, "shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy."l1s Neverthe-
less, the court found such a waiver of rights to conflict with the pur-
poses of the Code. 116 Therefore, the court held that the clause would 
only be enforceable if the debts were actually in the nature of alimony, 
support, or maintenance. 111 The court looked to the substance of the 
agreement and found the clause was a division of property and thus 
was dischargeable. I 18 
The issue in both Miller and Frey was whether mortgage payments 
by the debtor were in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. 
In Miller, the court weighed various factors in determining that the 
debt constituted support and was therefore nondischargeable. In Frey, 
the court found the debt to be dischargeable based upon state statutory 
law. In George, the court looked to the substance of the agreement and 
determined that joint debts owed by the debtor represented a property 
division and were dischargeable. 
In re Newman 119 evidences that recourse to state law is not neces-
sary to determine the nature of an obligation. In Newman, the bank-
ruptcy court decided that the question of whether an obligation 
constitutes alimony, support, or maintenance should be determined 
under federal bankruptcy law.120 The court looked to the substance of 
the agreement and determined that the husband's obligation under the 
property settlement to preserve the marital home by paying attendant 
expenses was in the nature of support, and therefore nondischarge-
able. 121 The factors the court held to be determinative in this case were 
whether the obligation terminated upon death or remarriage, whether 
the payment appeared to balance disparate incomes, whether it was 
payable in installments over a substantial period of time, and whether 
114. 15 BanIa. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1981). 
115. Id at 248. 
116. Id at 249. 
117.Id 
118. Id The debts in question were owed to several creditors including Beneficial Fi-
nance Co., Visa. and the O'Neil Co. Id at 248. 
119. 15 BanIa. 67 (M.D. Fla. 1981). 
120. Id at 69. 
121. Id at 69-70. The court quoted Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 
1961): 
It is safe to say that the obligation to maintain and support a family 
includes the obligation to keep a roof over their heads. It is obvious that 
this is what the bankrupt undertook to do when he agreed to keep up the 
installment payments on the trust deed upon the home in which his di-
vorced wife and children were to live. That the obligation has become 
unduly burdensome cannot be considered in determining the legal effect 
of his discharge. 
15 BanIa. at 70. 
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minor children were involved. 122 
Other courts follow the Newman decision and determine the na-
ture of an obligation without any reference to state law. 123 These 
courts use the various tests established to determine whether a debt is 
dischargeable, and consider similar factors to those previously enumer-
ated. 124 It is these courts that appear to be in accord with the legislative 
history of the Code when they maintain that federal law is controlling. 
C Third Party Debts 
When the Code was first enacted, commentators were unsure how 
the courts would treat joint debts owed to third parties. 125 A literal 
reading of section 523(a)(5), which applies to "a spouse, former spouse, 
or child of the debtor," appears to allow debts owed to third parties to 
be discharged. 126 It is reported in the legislative history that only sup-
port owed directly to a spouse or dependent is nondischargeable under 
the Code. 127 However, the legislative history also provides that if the 
debtor undertakes to hold the spouse harmless from debts to third par-
ties, and if the obligation is in the nature of alimony, support, or main-
tenance, the debt is nondischargeable. 128 Consequently, courts take 
different approaches and reach different conclusions when confronted 
with the issue of whether a debt owed to a third party is excepted from 
discharge in bankruptcy. Section 523(a)(5)(A) provides that debts 
found to be alimony, maintenance, or support are dischargeable if as-
signed to another entity.129 A minority of jurisdictions expand section 
523(a)(5)(A) to hold that debts payable to third parties are always dis-
122. 15 Bankr. at 69-70. 
123. See, e.g., In re Huggins, 12 Bankr. 850 (D. Kan. 1981); see also supra notes 75-99 
and accompanying text. 
124. See supra notes 75-99 and accompanying text; see also In re Petoske, 16 Bankr. 
412 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Cf. In re Fontaine, 14 BanIa. 11 (D.R.I. 1981); In re 
Stachowiak, 16 Bankr. 392 (D. Nev. 1982). 
125. See 1 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 27.37-.41 (1981). COWANS, 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.6 (interim ed. 1980). See generally Shiffer, 
The New Bankruptcy Reform Act: It's Implications for Family Law Practitioners, 
19 J. FAM. L. 1,20-26 (1981); Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgollen, 52 IND. L.J. 469, 480-83 (1977). 
126. See In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D. 
Minn. 1980); H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6320. See generally 1 NORTON, BANK-
RUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.37 (1981). 
127. See 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5865, 6320, 6454,6522. 
128. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6320; see also COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 6.6 (interim ed. 1980). 
129. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1981). This section was amended by Pub. L. 
No. 97-35, § 2334(b), 95 Stat. 863 (1981), effective August 13, 1981. The amend-
ment added "other than debt assignments pursuant to § 402(a)(26) of the Social 
Security Act." Id 
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chargeable. 130 However, .most courts severely limit the scope of this 
section and maintain that it pertains only to assignments to state wel-
fare agencies and similar entities. 13l 
Irrespective of the Code's provisions and the legislative history, 
numerous decisions apply the same rationale to both third party debts 
and to debts owed to a wife and child. 132 If a court finds a debt to be in 
the nature of alimony, support, or maintenance, it will be held nondis-
chargeable. 133 For example, in In re French, 134 the court construed the 
legislative history of section 523(a)(5) as creating a nondischargeable 
obligation even though a debt is owed to a third party.135 The French 
Court, as well as other COUrts,136 decided that it is the substance of the 
obligation, not the manner of payment, that will determine its 
dischargeability. 
Similarly, in Stranathan v. Stowell, 137 the issue before the bank-
ruptcy court was whether amounts payable to third parties, on debts for 
which spouses are jointly liable, can be held nondischargeable as ali-
mony, maintenance, or support.138 The court noted that "[p]ayments to 
a third party for joint debts which release the nonpaying spouse from 
the financial obligation are actually indirect payments to the 
spouse."139 Hence, as long as the required payments are determined to 
be alimony, maintenance, or support, and not a property settlement or 
division of debts, the payments can be held to be nondischargeable 
under section 523(a)(5) of the Code. 14O Likewise, in In re Growney, 141 
the court held that the payment of medical and dental bills, although 
owed to third parties, constitutes support and therefore are nondis-
130. See In re Crawford, 8 Bankr. 552 (D. Kan. 1981); In re Allen, 4 Bankr. 617 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1981); In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981). 
131. See In re French, 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re Wells, 8 Bankr. 189 (N.D. 
Ill. 1981);In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 1980). One court noted that the test 
of whether a debt has been assigned under section 523(a)(5)(A) is whether or not 
the nonpaying spouse will receive any present benefit from the payment of the 
debt. Stranathan v. Stowell, 15 Bankr. 223 (D. Neb. 1981). 
132. See, e.g., In re French, 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 
(D. Utah 1980); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Williams, 3 
Bankr. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re 
Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D; Ind. 1980). 
133. See In re French, 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 
(N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Warner, 5 
Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980); In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 1980). 
134. 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
135.Id at 466-67. 
136. See In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D. 
Fla. 1980); In re Williams, 3 Bankr. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 
404 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
137. 15 Bankr. 223 (D. Neb. 1981). 
138. Id at 225. 
139. Id at 225-26. 
140. Id 
141. 15 Bankr. 849 (W.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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chargeable. 142 The court reasoned that "if the debtor fail[ed] to satisfy 
his obligations to the medical claimants, the debtor 'at the same time, 
fails to satisfy his obligation to his wife [and children].' "143 
In re Daiker 144 and In re Dirks 14S are examples of cases which 
have held debts to third parties to be dischargeable. In Daiker, the 
court determined that under the Code it must first decide if a debt is 
payable directly to the spouse. If the debt is paid to a third person, the 
court held that it is dischargeable regardless of the characterization of 
the debt as alimony, support, or maintenance. l46 Thus, the court ruled 
that the husband's obligation under the divorce decree to pay certain 
household debts to third parties was dischargeable as a matter of 
law. 147 In addition, the court emphasized the fact that the debts were 
joint obligations incurred incident to the marriage relationship. 148 
The divorce decree in Daiker also provided that the husband was 
to "hold harmless and indemnify" the wife in the event a creditor pur-
sued the ex-wife on any debts.149 The wife argued that this obligation 
constituted maintenance and support and was therefore nondischarge-
able. ISO The court addressed the wife's contention and recognized that 
a hold harmless agreement could be an obligation subject to the non-
dischargeable provisions of section 523(a)(5).lsl However, the court 
maintained that such a determination must be made ''within the frame-
work of federal law and must be consistent with the fresh start goal of 
the Bankruptcy Act."IS2 The court concluded that the hold harmless 
agreement was not in the nature of maintenance or support, since the 
wife waived any right to maintenance in the decree and there was no 
indication that the provision was intended to balance the relative in-
come of the parties. IS3 Of obvious paramount concern to the Daiker 
court was that the debtor be released from all obligations to be able to 
begin a fresh start. IS4 The court stated: 
It is only in those cases when it is clearly discernible that the 
142. Id. at 850 (citing In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981». The court so found even 
though the debts were paid directly to third parties. 
143. 15 Bankr. at 850. 
144. 5 Bankr. 348 (D. Minn. 1980). 
145. 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981). 
146. 5 Bankr. at 351. The court relied upon the legislative history of the code in inter-
preting the provision. Id. at 351 n.2. 
147. Id. at 352. The court noted that it would be contrary to its primary goal to pro-
vide relief to the debtor if it was to accede to the state court's interest in the divi-
sion of marital assets and obligations, maintenance, and support, and to deny the 
debtor his fresh start simply because his former wife chose not to seek the same 
relief on her own behalf. I d. 
148.Id. at 351. 
149.1d. 
150. Id. at 352. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 351. 
153. Id. at 352-53. 
154. Id. at 352. 
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divorce court intended to award support or maintenance to 
sEouse or child that this court should set aside the policy of 
'fresh start" in the Bankruptcy Code in favor of the state 
court's judgment of necessity and need for spouse and 
child. 155 
537 
A similar view was expressed in In re Dirks. 156 The Dirks court 
also recognized that the major policy concern under the Code is to give 
the debtor a fresh start. 157 Since the exceptions to discharge vitiate this 
fresh start, the court held that they must be interpreted narrowly, 158 
and found that under section S23(a)(S)(A) a debt payable to a third 
party is dischargeable. 159 The court noted that "[c]ourts which allow 
creditors to take advantage of this exception under the guise of alimony 
contravene the fresh start policy as well as widen the supposedly nar-
row exceptions to dischargeability."16o The court then proceeded to ex-
tensively discuss and interpret the sections of the Code relative to third 
party debts and assignments. 
First, the court ruled that since obligations in the nature of ali-
mony terminate upon death or remarriage of the spouse, finding a debt 
to a third party nondischargeable does not comport with the intention 
to award support, since a third party creditor can enforce collection of 
debts regardless of the future circumstances of the ex-wife. 161 Thus, the 
court reasoned that in order to accomplish the pu~ose of section 
523(a)(S), such a debt to a third party is dischargeable. 1 2 However, the 
ISS. Id 
156. 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981). The wife sought to have the court declare that 
certain debts ordered to be paid by the debtor in a prior divorce proceeding were 
nondischargeable. The divorce decree provided in pertinent part: 
Petitioner . . . is ordered to assume and pay as his sole and separate 
obligation the following community debts: 
(a) The indebtedness to Rio Grande Valley Bank ... 
(b) The indebtedness to Cessna Aircraft ... 
(c) The indebtedness to First National Bank ... 
(d) The indebtedness to Harold Dirks .. . 
(e) The indebtedness to Frank Skarritt .. . 
(f) The indebtedness to Master Charge . . . 
(g) The indebtedness to VISA . . . . 
Id at 776-77. 
157. Id at 779. 
158. Id 
159. Id The court reasoned that such a debt is in fact assigned to, and thus payable to, 
another entity. Id 
160. Id The court believed that the purpose of the section S23(a)(5) exception is to 
protect spouses and children, not creditors. Id 
161. Id at 780. Not discharging third party debts totally defeats the policy of fresh 
start since creditors are the very parties against whom the debtor is given protec-
tion. Id at 779. But if. In re Duckson, 13 Bankr. 373 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (creditor 
does not have standing to object to debtor's discharge). 
162. IS Bankr. at 780. But see In re Bell,S Bankr. 653 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (finding 
payments made to third parties in lieu of alimony nondischargeable); In re Peli-
kant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (same); In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 
1980) (same). 
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court did express concern for the ex-spouse and noted that she could 
file a proceeding in bankruptcy court for a determination of whether 
the palment to the third party was intended to be alimony or sup-
port. 16 The bankruptcy court could then order the payment of ali-
mony to the spouse in an amount measured by the payment to the third 
party creditor. 164 
Second, the court interpreted section 523(a)(5)(A) to apply to more 
than technical assignments. 165 The court held that this section should 
be read as a whole unit with each part accorded no greater weight than 
any other part. 166 Subsection A provides that a debt which is "assigned 
to another entity voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise" is dis-
chargeable. 167 Subsection B provides that a debt is dischargeable "un-
less such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or 
support." 168 Thus, the court concluded that jurisdictions which find 
debts to third parties nondischargeable on the grounds that the pay-
ments are meant to be alimony in effect read subsection B to the total 
exclusion of subsection A.169 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PLANNING TIPS 
A. Recommendations 
A plain reading of section 523(a)(5) evidences Congress' intent for 
the judiciary to balance the right of a person to begin fresh after he has 
filed for bankruptcy against that person's obligations to his family in 
determining the dischargeability of a marital debt. Many courts defeat 
the policy of fresh start and disallow the discharge of third party debts. 
In addition, courts still rely on state law rather than federal bankruptcy 
law to determine whether an obligation is in the nature of alimony, 
support, or maintenance, or whether it is a property settlement. 
Unfortunately, the result is that courts apply the same rationale 
today as they did under the 1898 Act. Thus, it is apparent that the 
enactment of section 523(a)(5) did not bring about all of the intended 
results. A possible solution is for Congress to amend the Code to make 
163. 15 Bankr. at 780. 
164. Id 
165. Id The court reasoned that since Congress inserted the words "or otherwise" in 
section 523(a)(5), these words are intended to broaden the scope of the meaning of 
assignment to include more than just technical assignments. Id Thus, the Dirks 
court rejected cases holding that section 523(a)(5)(A) does not apply to assign-
ments which are informal. 15 Bankr. at 781; see, e.g., In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d 
Cir. 1981);In re Rank, 12 Bankr. 418 (D. Kan. 1981). Further, the court criticized 
those cases which limited the scope of the section to welfare agencies, 'since the 
term "entity" as defined in II U.S.C. § 101 (14) (Supp. V 1981) includes more 
than just welfare agencies. 15 Bankr. at 781. See, e.g., In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 
(N.D. lli. 1980); In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 1980). 
166. 15 Bankr. at 781. 
167. See II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A)(Supp. V 1981). 
168. Id § 523(a)(5)(B). 
169. 15 Bankr. at 781. 
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section 523(a)(5) more specific with regard to what types of debts are 
dischargeable. This appears to be a feasible solution since Congress 
has done this with other sections of the Code. For example, in section 
522 Congress has set forth ~ecific exemptions to which the debtor is 
entitled under federal law. 17 The purpose of the exemption section is 
the same as that of section 523(a)(5}-it is for the benefit of the debtor's 
family, who may be destitute, and for the benefit of the public, who 
might otherwise be burdened with support of an insolvent debtor's 
family. 171 Debts which should be addressed are attorney's fees, medi-
cal expenses for children, mortgage payments, debts for household 
items and automobiles, and debts incurred through general hold harm-
less agreements. The Code should also be amended to include narrow 
definitions of the terms "alimony," "maintenance," and "support," for 
the purpose of federal bankruptcy law. 
However, since no bills are currently on the floor in Congress, it 
does not appear likely that this section of the Code will be amended in 
the near future. Consequently, courts could begin to narrowly interpret 
the exceptions to discharge and thereby preserve the Bankruptcy 
Code's underlying policy of giving a debtor a fresh start. 
B. Planning Tips 
Although the goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow the debtor a 
fresh start free from pre-existing obligations, it is clear that the law 
favors family support obligations. In drafting a property settlement 
agreement or divorce decree, the attorney must make certain that the 
actual intent of the parties is clear. Further, the agreement should be 
drafted so that it clearly distinguishes alimony and support obligations 
from property settlements. 
If the parties have a great number of debts from the marriage, the 
attorney should consider the feasibility of both parties filing for bank-
ruptcy before the divorce is final. The Code provides that two qualified 
debtors or a qualified debtor and a spouse may file a joint bankruptcy 
petition. 172 Under the Code, there is no requirement that the parties be 
living together at the time of filing. 173 In order to insure compliance 
with the procedural aspects of the Code, attorneys should also be aware 
of the automatic stay provisions,174 removal provisions,175 and provi-
sions relating to the powers of the trusteep6 
170. See 11 u.s.c. § 522 (Supp. V 1981). 
171. See In re Swartz, 18 Banlcr. 454 (D. Mass. 1982). 
172. See 11 U.S.c. § 302(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
173.ld 
174. See 11 U.S.c. § 362 (Supp. V 1981). 
175. See 28 U.S.c. § 1478(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
176. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 541 (Supp. V 1981). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In enacting section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Con-
gress attempted to ease the confusion surrounding the discharge ability 
of marital obligations. A review of the case law decided under the 
Code indicates that this attempt was only partially successful. Courts 
are still faced with the difficult task of interpreting divorce decrees and 
property settlement agreements in order to determine the nature of the 
debtor's marital obligations under bankruptcy law. Since there is no 
federal domestic relations law, courts must resort to state law in inter-
preting these agreements. Unfortunately, state law definitions of mari-
tal obligations differ, and at times appear to be in direct conflict with 
the underlying policy of the Code. Consequently, attorneys should be 
careful in drafting divorce decrees and settlement agreements, clearly 
stating the intent of the parties. In addition, courts must narrowly in-
terpret such agreements to accomodate the fresh start policy of the 
Code. 
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